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Abstract  A wide diversity of rankings of opportunity sets are characterized 
through what is now commonly called the freedom of choice literature. An op-
portunity set is better ranked when it provides more freedom. This survey is or-
ganized as a typology of the rankings, according to the specific conception of free-
dom they capture: freedom of choice, freedom as autonomy, freedom as exercise of 
significant choices, negative freedom. The role of preferences in freedom rankings 
is discussed in the conclusion. 
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Introduction 
The literature of ranking opportunity sets (Barberá et al. (2004)), tackles a 
wide range of problems such as choosing in an uncertain environment or 
valuing freedom of choice per se. This article focuses on the normative side 
of this literature, now commonly called the freedom of choice literature 
and in which the range and/or the content of opportunity sets is at stake.  
To define an opportunity set, one can represent individual choice as a 
two stages problem. At the first stage, an individual makes decisions which 
will constrain the scope of later feasible choices over options. This 
amounts to picking one set of options among many, or, even, to rank sets 
of options. At the second stage, the individual chooses one option out of 
the previous set. Let us say an opportunity set is a restaurant menu: you 
first choose the restaurant among all available restaurants in the city, then 
you pick a meal from the chosen restaurant’s menu. The aim of the free-
dom of choice literature is to rank opportunity sets according to some 
normative criterion such as utility, freedom of choice, specific notions of 
freedom, or individual overall well-being.  
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Let   be the universal set of alternatives. Let  X ,, . . . x yX ∈  be the alterna-
tives (commodities, options, actions...) the agent may be faced with at sec-
ond stage. Let   be the cardinality of the set  . As in the traditional 
microeconomic framework, individuals have preferences over the 
alternatives, standing for his utility over the options. Let   be a preorder, 
i.e. a reflexive and transitive binary relation over  . 
X  X
R
X xRy  means that the 
option  x  is at least considered as good as  y  according to preferences  . 
The symmetric and asymmetric part of   are respectively denoted   and 
. Let   be the set of all non-empty subsets of  . The elements of 
, denoted as 
R
R I
P () ΠX X
( ΠX ) A B , ,... are the opportunity sets the agent may be faced 
with in the first stage. Let  A   be the cardinality of the set  . Let V be a 
preorder, i.e. a reflexive and transitive binary relation defined over  . 
For all  , (
A
() ΠX
, ∈ ( ΠX ) AB A B
A
V ) is to be interpreted as ‘the set   is consid-
ered at least equally good than   according to the specific value at stake’. 
It could mean, for instance: ‘  provides at least as much freedom as  ’. 
The symmetric part and assymetric part of   are respectively   and  . 
In the freedom of choice literature, the preorder   is characterized 
axiomatically, i.e. the set of basic conditions under which a specific 




  V ∼
V
This paper is a survey of the freedom of choice literature.1 In almost 
every paper of this literature, we find the following interpretation of the 
characterized rankings: if the opportunity set   is ranked higher than  , 
 provides more freedom of choice. The diversity of the rankings calls for 
another look at the actual definition of freedom of choice. The concept of 
freedom captured by each ranking deserves an explicit definition, rather 
than the vague ‘freedom of choice’. A formal representation of a ranking is 
attached to a specific notion of freedom. Hence this survey provides a 




As a consequence of this focus on the normative interpretation, I will 
ignore those rankings which are extensions of each conception of freedom; 
I will restrict myself to presenting one ranking for each of them. I will es-
pecially focus on the results consistent with most standard formal repre-
sentation in the literature, as in Pattanaik and Xu’s seminal paper of 1990; 
the interpretation of the results based on distinct frameworks (for instance 
Klemish-Alhert (1993)) will be referred to but will not be given an exten-
sive presentation. Furthermore, some contributions to the freedom of 
                 
1 To my knowledge, there does not exist any specific survey on the freedom of choice 
literature. For a general survey on the rankings of opportunity sets, see Barberá et al. (2004). 
For a critical presentation of the freedom of choice literature, see Bavetta (1995), (2004). For 
a survey of a closely related literature, equal opportunity, see Peragine (1999). A. Baujard: Conceptions of Freedom and Ranking Opportunity Sets 233 
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choice literature do not focus specifically on the issue of normative in-
terpretation but rather on the extension of existing results to a different 
framework, such as the corresponding results in economic context (see 
Pattanaik and Xu (2000b) or Arlegi et al. (2005)); for this reason, they will 
not figure in this survey.  
It should also be remarked that other interpretations of the rankings 
discussed here are certainly possible. I do not pretend to close the discus-
sion in this regard.2 Some authors might even find my interpretation of 
their ranking controversial: for instance, some authors consider that the 
idea of preference for freedom is a conception of freedom of choice while, 
here, it will be taken as an element of global well-being. The attribution of 
a normative tag to each ranking is intended to be meaningful as a whole to 
be able to see where the freedom of choice literature is going.  
How is the typology organized? It could straightforwardly be based on 
the corresponding axioms: each ranking is characterized by axioms, which 
can also be called ‘conditions’, or ‘definitions’, which contribute to capture 
some specific value. A typical presentation of the resulting typology could 
be summarized through a large table, with axioms in columns and speci-
fied rankings in rows. A ranking, characterized by a set of axioms, each of 
them being associated with some specific and stable interpretation, would 
be clearly presented. Unfortunately, the freedom of choice literature is not 
sufficiently unified to build such a coherent table. The problem is that the 
axioms, which are meant to capture a specific meaning, are formulated in 
quite different ways in different papers (e.g. the strong monotonicity 
axiom). Hence a typology of the rankings from the freedom of choice lit-
erature cannot be based on axioms but rather on the desired meaning of 
the axiom, such as the intrinsic importance of a wider of choice (e.g. any 
formulation of the monotonicity axiom) or the value of utility of achieved 
choices (e.g. dominance axioms).  
The richness of this literature indeed yields to distinctions between 
different notions of freedom, even different nuances of the concept of free-
dom of choice. Note I will neither discuss the social aspects of freedom 
(see Sugden (1985), Carter (2004), Oppenheim (1995), (2004)), nor politi-
cal liberties or freedom of the will (see Hayek (1960: 11–21)). Instead, I 
will concentrate on freedom of choice as opportunity (section 2), freedom 
of choice as autonomy (section 3), freedom as the exercise of choice (sec-
tion 4), and negative freedom (section 5). As concluding remarks, I will 
discuss the role of the main axioms used to characterize the rankings (sub-
section 6.1). Then, challenging the indifference condition, I will imagine 
                 
2 See, for instance, the discussion of the concept of freedom under the cardinal ranking by 
I. Carter (2004). 234  Homo Oeconomicus 24(2) 
what a ranking of opportunity sets based on utility or overall freedom 
would look like (subsection 2). Finally, I will discuss the special links 
between preferences and freedom in the freedom of choice literature and I 
will argue for a strong distinction between two cases: a certain type of 
freedom ranking, or an individual overall well-being ranking, based on 
different prudential values among which freedom (subsection 3).  
1. Freedom as opportunity: the role of the scope of choice 
The ‘freedom of choice literature’ was initiated by Pattanaik and Xu’s 
(1990) seminal article. They maintained that freedom of choice is captured 
by the combination of three conditions: indifference to no-choice situa-
tions, independence and simple monotonicity.  
The first condition is a way to express the value of freedom of choice 
because it captures the fact that there is choice (Carter 2004: 72). Present-
ing no-choice situations is likely to capture the idea of no-choice. The idea 
is that there is no reason why one singleton would provide more choice 
than another singleton insofar as there is no choice in each. Here the 
difference between ranking according to choice or freedom of choice 
(represented by  ) on the one hand and utility (represented by  ) on the 
other is made very clear. If utility was at stake, the two singletons would 
not be indifferent but their ranking would be based on the preference over 
the options.  
  P
Condition 1  [Indifference between no-choice situations]  , x yX ∀ ∈ , 
{} {} y ∼
a is 
.   x
The second condition refers to the intrinsic importance of freedom of 
choice, which is defined by Carter (1999: 41) as follows: ‘One phenomenon 
 has an intrinsic value if and only if   is one end in itself, i.e., if   has 
a positive total value which is not reducible with the value of any other 
phenomenon’. Carter proposes a test to determine whether or not an in-
trinsic importance to freedom of choice is expressed in some judgment. 
Let there be two situations  1 S nd  2 S .  2 composed by the options con-
tained in  1 S  and eight others. The preferred options are already included 
in  1 S . One eventually must choose only one option. Which of the two sets 
seem to be more valuable? If I find  2 S  more valuable, freedom has an 
intrinsic importance to me. The options that render the set valuable are 
not only the preferred options but also the others that are not preferred. I 
find valuable to be able to push back the nine other options. My ‘yes’ to 
one option is meaningful because I was also able to say ‘no’ to other op-
tions; I do choose the kind of life I do wish to live, and eventually reveal 
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ered better than less choice, whatever the options. The valuation of ‘more 
choice’ or ‘more freedom of choice’ per se then requires a strict 
monotonicity condition.  
Condition 2. [Strict  monotonicity]  ,,, { , } { } x yX xy x y y ∀ ∈≠   .  
A third condition is necessary to induce a ranking. Pattanaik and Xu 
propose an independence condition, requiring that if   and   are two 
possible available sets and if 
A B
x  does not belong either to   or to  , then 
the ranking of   and   in terms of freedom
A B
A B 3 corresponds to the ranking 
of  {} A x ∪  and  .   { B ∪ } x
Condition 3. [Independence]  ∀ ∈∀ ∈ ∪ ,( ) , ( AB ΠX x XA B )  
⎡⎤ ∪∪ ⎣⎦ if and only if { } { } . A BA x B VV x  
According to the cardinal ranking,4 the more options in a set, the more 
choice is provided by the set. The scope of choice is simply assessed by 
counting the number of options contained in the set.  
Rule 1.  [Cardinal ranking] For all  ,( AB ΠX ) ∈ ,  A B V  if and only if 
.   ≥ #A #B
                
Proposition 1.  [Pattanaik and Xu 1990] Preorder V satisfies simple 
monotonicity (condition 2), indifference between no choice situations 
(condition 1) and independence (condition 3) if and only if   is the 
cardinal ranking. 
V
The cardinal ranking rule is characterized by conditions capturing the 
ideas of freedom, choice and freedom of choice. Nevertheless, the simplic-
ity of this result has given rise to much debate. Several papers, written in 
direct reaction to Pattanaik and Xu (1990)’s proposition, had considerable 
importance renewing debates about freedom: what it means, how to repre-
sent it formally, and what relevant elements should be taken into account. 
Puppe (1995) raised the problem of incompatibility of valuing utility – as 
experience for preference satisfaction – and freedom – as opportunities for 
preference satisfaction – which generated a discussion about the role of 
 
3 The fact that this version of the independence condition captures the idea of freedom of 
choice is controversial. See Carter (2004). 
4 For a presentation and justification of this rule, see Jones et Sugden (1982), Sen (1985), 
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utility (see also Gravel (1994), (1998)). This discussion lead to the consid-
eration of reasonable preferences by the valuation of autonomy (see sec-
tion 3), and to the literature on global well-being based on several pruden-
tial values (see subsection 3). In addition, Klemish-Alhert (1993) brought 
to light the importance of diversity in valuing choice, which lead to the de-
velopment of several frameworks likely to capture the valuation of the ex-
ercise of significant choices (see section 4). As we notice, the literature 
generated by Pattanaik and Xu’s (1990) paper tackles different issues, 
wider than just freedom of choice. While they introduced a simple way to 
represent freedom of choice as a pure opportunity concept, the so-called 
‘freedom of choice literature’ has spread in diverse directions to include 
other conceptions of freedom such as freedom as autonomy, exercice or 
negative freedom, as well as including diverse conceptions of global well-
being, in which freedom and utility are ingredients of the overall 
judgement.  
2. Freedom as autonomy: the role of reasonable preferences 
An individual is autonomous if she makes choices entirely according to her 
will, meaning her choices are independent of her conditionings or the will 
of other people.  
Jones and Sugden (1982) point to a tension between the economic 
theory of choice according to which the preferences are given, such as the 
standard framework of microeconomic theory and the valuation of auton-
omy. Take the standard representation of choice in economics, which 
relies on the strong model of preferences (Haslett 1990). Whenever i 
chooses  x  rather than  y  among the opportunity set {,} x y , he reveals his 
preference for x  over  y . For i,  x  is better than  y . Imagine now a second 
case: i is presented with opportunity set and is forced to have x  by force, 
coercion, pity, etc., but in any case, without even asking i what he desired. i 
derives the exact same satisfaction in both cases since he will anyways get 
his preferred option. Jones and Sugden (1982: 59) propose to challenge the 
assumption of given preferences to avoid this annoying consequence: 
To suppose that the act of choice requires the exercise of mental powers is to 
suppose that the chooser is in some considerable measure an autonomous 
agent; whatever he chooses, he might have chosen something else. There is a 
tension between this assumption and the idea implied in the economic theory 
of choice, that preferences are given. What makes significant choice possible is 
that preferences are not just part of a person’s physiology or psychology like the 
color of his eyes or a tendency to depression. […] The concept of significant 
choice can best be understood by considering the various preferences that a 
person might have, rather than merely the preferences that he actually reveals 
when he finally makes a choice. Preferences only catch the idea of the A. Baujard: Conceptions of Freedom and Ranking Opportunity Sets 237 
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satisfaction we get from different options, whatever chosen or imposed. 
Preferences are therefore insensitive to the idea of autonomy. In the example, i 
has definitely more autonomy in the first case than in the second case. His 
choice is indeed autonomous if he chooses something while he could have 
chosen something else; he is autonomous if his preference relation could 
actually have been different. Accounting for other possible preferences excludes 
cases where he is obliged to get his preferred option. Therefore, the 
introduction of a wide scope of possible preferences in the assessment of 
opportunity sets, which we will now call ‘reasonable preferences’, is necessary to 
capture the idea of autonomy: the wider the range of reasonably chosen op-
tions5 from an opportunity set is, the more autonomous the person who faces it 
is.  
Following Jones and Sugden (1982) and Puppe (1998), the options that 
are likely to be chosen, according to reasonable preferences, will be called 
essential options. Denote   as the subset of essential alternatives from 
the set  . This also means that an option is essential if extracting it from 
the set strictly decreases the freedom derived from a set: 
() EA
A
() { {} } EA x A A A \x := ∈ :   .  
An option is ineligible if it could never be chosen, e.g. by any reason-
able preference. The fact that certain option may never be chosen has an 
important consequence for the formulation of monotonicity condition. If 
you add another option to a set, you can no longer believe that autonomy 
is increased no matter what the option is. However, adding an option will 
never decrease the autonomy provided by the set if it is ineligible. Hence, 
while a strict monotonicity condition is appealing for freedom of choice, it 
is less so for the autonomy ranking, which only needs to respect a weak 
monotonicity condition.  
Condition 4.  [Weak monotonicity] For all  ∈ ,, { , } { } . x yX x y x V  
The weak monotonicity condition is actually a very significant weak-
ening, because all that is necessary here is a ‘conditional’ monotonicity: the 
new option is likely to raise autonomy in the only case in which it is likely 
to be chosen. Indeed, the kind of additional alternatives that will increase 
                 
5 Note that it is equivalent, in the opportunity set framework, to think in terms of possibly 
chosen option in a set or in terms of possible preference. As a matter of fact, all options are 
considered initially before picking one single option (from the set), which is the best element 
according to a preference relation. If there are several possible preference relations, there 
might be several possible chosen options.  238  Homo Oeconomicus 24(2) 
the autonomy has to be specified. Another monotonicity condition, called 
I-monotonicity and proposed by Pattanaik and Xu (1998), captures the 
idea according to which only essential alternatives may increase the 
autonomy provided by an opportunity set. Considering all reasonable 
preferences to identify the best elements, for all x X ∈  and all  AZ ∈ , we 
write  [] x IA if and only if    ∪= ({ } ) max A x A∪ { } ; x [] x PA if and only if 
=∪ m a x ( {} {} ) ; x Ax    if and only if  [] APx max( { }) x Ax ∉ ∪ .  
Condition 5.  [I-monotonicity] For all  ,( AB ΠX ) ∈ , and for all  \, x XA ∈  
([] IA ) AB V } Ax ∪    and   implies [{ .   ] B x
The assessment of autonomy will be different according to the breadth 
of possible preferences. But now, we need to distinguish between the 
nature of restrictions of the set of possible preferences to a set of reason-
able preferences on the one hand, and the design of such restrictions on 
the other.  
2.1  All rational preferences are reasonable: Valuing the scope of choice 
At the one extreme, all possible rational preference may be considered as 
reasonable. Even very odd and eccentric preferences should be accepted as 
reasonable. J. S. Mill (1859: 83) for instance would defend this idea ac-
cording to which there is no justification to restrict the scope of reasonable 
preferences. Therefore, each option from a set is essential, no matter which 
it is. The required monotonicity condition here is exactly equivalent to 
strict monotonicity. We are then brought back to cardinal ranking and 
Pattanaik and Xu (1990)’s result.  
2.2  Just one preference ordering is reasonable: Valuing indirect utility 
At the other extreme, if just one preference is considered as reasonable, the 
actual individual preference, then we are back to the traditional rule based 
on the comparison of indirect utilities. Hence,  
Rule 2. For  all  ,   if an only if [m .   () AB ΠX ,∈ AB V ax( ) max( )] AR B
2.3  Some preferences are reasonable, some are not: Valuing autonomy 
Restrictions on the family of acceptable preferences may be justified. For 
instance, ‘no reasonable person may ever consider that being beheaded at 
dawn’ is an acceptable restriction. Although to my knowledge not much in 
the freedom of choice literature describes formally different objects of 
preferences, such as this counter example suggests – the choice of being A. Baujard: Conceptions of Freedom and Ranking Opportunity Sets 239 
 
16/12/2007 12:11  04-24-02 Baujard.doc
killed is indeed not an object of reasonable desire. The focus is rather on 
the design of the restriction, specifying whether or not the fact that an op-
tion is essential is given. In other words, these autonomy rankings rely on 
information on the best or worse elements of reasonable preferences. An 
intuitive rule based on the cardinality of essential options represents a 
mere conception of autonomy, focusing on essential options. An annoying 
counter example generated by this previous rule is avoided when ineligible 
options, or a wider range of elements than just essential options, are taken 
into account.  
2.3.1  Simple cardinality of essential options 
If, for all reasonable preferences, x  is strictly worse than at least one op-
tion from  , e.g if  A x  is ineligible, then adding x  to   does not raise 
autonomy.  
A
Condition 6. [Type 1 irrelevance of dominated alternatives] For all 
 and for all  () AB ΠX ,∈ x X ∈ , [] APx AB V
B V {} ∪
 if  , then [  if and only if 
 and [  if and only if  .   {} ] AxB ∪ V A ] x BA V
The basic composition condition, corresponding to an extension of the 
independence condition to inclusions of any sets rather than a singleton, is 
the following: for all  ,, () , ABC ΠX ∈  we have :   implies that, for 
all   If   and  , we could expect that 
. This formulation is not used in this setting for it is likely 
to induce counter-examples. If   and C  share too numerous common 
elements, it is possible than   provides less freedom nevertheless. 
The composition condition proposed by Sen (1991) is designed to avoid 
this annoying consequence : we further assume that the sets do not have 
common elements, e.g. 
AAB ∪ ∼




CA C A ∪∼∪
ACBD ∪∪ V
C
D ∩ =∩= ∅ . But even this new formula-
tion is likely to induce counter-examples in this settings for some alterna-
tives from the sets could be ineligible. The specific composition condition 
proposed by Pattanaik and Xu (1998) requires then that each distinct al-
ternative from a set is an essential alternative.  
Condition 7.  [Composition] For all  ,,, () , ABCD ΠX ∈  such that 
(, m a x ( ) , m a x ( ) ) . A CBD a n d AC AC a n d BD BD ∩=∩= ∅ ∪ =∪ ∪ =∪  
[AB V  and   implies [ , and   and   
implies [] .  
] CD V
ACB ∪∪  
] [AB V ACBD ∪∪ V ] CD  
D
Cardinal ranking of essential alternatives compares opportunity sets ac-
cording to the number of essential alternatives in the sets.  240  Homo Oeconomicus 24(2) 
Rule 3.  [Cardinal ranking of essential alternatives] For all  ,( AB ΠX ) , ∈  
⎡⎤ ≥ #max( ) #max( ) , ⎣⎦ A Bif and only if A B V max(  where #  stands for 
the number of time a reasonable preference considers an element from A 
is optimal.  
) A
Proposition 2.  [Pattanaik and Xu 1998] The relation V  satisfies indiffer-
ence between no choice situations (condition 1), I-monotonicity (condi-
tion 5), type 1 irrelevance of dominated alternatives (condition 6), and 
composition (condition 7) if and only if V  is the cardinal ranking of 
essential alternatives.  
Example 1.  Consider the following example. Take two sets.  {,} A xy =  
and  {, } Bz w =  and two possible reasonable orderings of preferences: 
y xPyPzPw  and  Px Pw Pz ′′ ′ . The set of essential elements from   is there-
fore 
A
{,} x y  and from   is  . In both cases, the cardinality of essential 
elements is the same, which induces that they provide exactly the same 
autonomy according to the rule 3. It is quite difficult to swallow when con-
sidering than a reasonable person would never choose an option from   if 
he was given the choice to pick one from   as well. Intuitively, the fact 
that some elements are more likely to be chosen is important, not just the 
fact that they are likely to be chosen in some set. Therefore, possessing 
more essential elements is not necessarily better; counting essential ele-
ments is not sufficient to capture the idea of “more autonomy” because it 
does not consider relevant information on the reasonable preferences.  
B {, } zw
A
B
2.3.2  Weighted cardinality rule of essential options 
Another form of restriction consists in taking into account the role of in-
eligible actions in the set.  
We first formulate dominance and non-dominance conditions in a 
similar framework.  
Condition 8.  [Simple non-dominance] For all  , x yX ∈ , if  [] x Iy, then 
{} {} y ∼ .   x
Condition 9.  [Simple dominance] For all  , x yX ∈ , if  [] x Py, then 
{} {} y   .   x
If, for all reasonable preferences, x  is strictly worse than at least one 
option from  , i.e. if  A x  is ineligible, then the status of the set  {} Bx ∩  vis-
à-vis   should not be better nor worse that the status of B  vis-à-vis  .   A A
Condition 10.  [Type 2 irrelevance of dominated alternatives] For all A. Baujard: Conceptions of Freedom and Ranking Opportunity Sets 241 
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,( ) AB ΠX ∈ ,  and for all x X ∈  if  [] A Px, then [A B V  if and only if 
{} ] A Bx ∪ V  and [  if and only if  .   B V {} V A ] A Bx ∪
A weaker composition condition adds some further conditions to the 
composition condition 7: every alternative from  AD ∩  can be considered 
by a reasonable person to be at least as good as all alternatives in  , 
and every alternative in 
AD ∩
BC ∩  can be considered by a reasonable person 
to be at least as good as all alternatives in BC ∩ .  
Condition 11.  [Weak composition] For all  () ABCD ΠX , ,, ∈ ,  such that  
∩=∩= ∅ ∪ =∪ ∪ =∪
∪= ∪ ∪= ∪
( , max( ) , max( ) ,
max( ) , max( ) ),
A C B D and A C A C and A D A D
and B C B C and B D B D
 
[AB V  and   implies [ , and   and   
implies [] . 
] CD V
ACB ∪∪  
] [AB V ACAD ∪∪ V ] CD  
D
Let 
B A  refers for all elements aA ∈  such that reasonable person may 
never consider   to be at least as good as all the elements of  . Of course, 
these elements are not necessarily identical with  . Pattanaik and Xu 
(1998) characterize a weighted cardinality rule of essential options. In this 
ranking of different sets, what is at stake is not just the number of essential 
alternatives in each sets but also the fact that these sets lead to more valu-
able choices, which rules out the paradox raised in example 1.  
a B
A B
Rule 4.  [Weighted cardinal ranking of essential alternatives] For all 
⎡⎤ ∈− ≥ ⎣⎦ , ( ), if and only if [max( ) ] [ max( ) ]
BA AB ΠX A B # A A # B B V − .  
Proposition 3.  [Pattanaik et Xu 1998] The relation V  satisfies simple 
dominance (condition 9), simple non-dominance (condition 8), I-
monotonicity (condition 5), type 1 irrelevance of dominated alternatives 
(condition 6), type 2 irrelevance of dominated alternatives (condition 10) 
and weak composition (condition 11) if and only if V  is the weighted 
cardinal ranking of essential alternatives.  
2.3.3  Lexicographic version of the cardinality rule 
Another way to avoid the problem raised by example 1 is given by the lexi-
cographic approach of the cardinal ranking. Romero-Medina (2001: 185) 
proposes to ‘sequentially remove the first element in all the reasonable 
persons’ preferences and compare the available sets of newspapers 
according to this new set of preferences. This new reference set where 
alternatives are sequentially eliminated […] is a compromised idea of 242  Homo Oeconomicus 24(2) 
freedom that can only be justified when the set of reasonable preferences 
cannot discriminate’.  
3. Freedom as the exercise of significant choices: the role of diversity 
The independence condition (see condition 3) used in the cardinal rank-
ing (rule 1) is likely to raise some problems, well illustrated by this exam-
ple (Pattanaik and Xu 1990: 389).  
Let’s take the following universal set of options: {train, car 1, car 2}. By 
indifference, we get: {train} {car 1}. By independence, we then get: {train, 
car 2}∼ {car 1, car 2}, meaning that these two sets offers exactly the same 
freedom of choice. Appealing to intuition, this result raises substantial 
problems. The first set allows for a choice among a wide scope of diverse 
transportation modes. The choice of options among the first set is then 
harder and more substantial because choosing train rather than car ex-
presses the kind of life you decided to lead. In the second set, the act of 
choosing just exercises on the kind of car, e.g. the color of the car, which is 
less significant. If we imagine that this second car is exactly similar in 
brand, type, series, color..., this result is even more annoying. It comes into 
conflict with the idea of valuing significant choices. To express this idea, 
the independence condition has to be weakened so that diversity or simi-
larity of options are now taken into account.  
∼
To speak of significant choice refers to two kinds of situations: accord-
ing to Jones and Sugden (1982: 57), ‘an option is not significant in relation 
to a choice set if it is either indistinguishable from another option or ineli-
gible.’ A choice between indistinguishable options is not significant be-
cause one may as well pick and not choose (Ullmann-Margalit and 
Morgenbesser 1977). The more diverse the options in the set, the more 
significant is the choice. Indeed, diversity induces a harder choice, mean-
ing the exercise of choice is more meaningful. J. S. Mill values significant 
choices and, through it, the exercise of choice in itself, whatever it happens 
to be. It is through the act of choice that human faculties develop: ‘The 
human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental 
activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice. 
[...] The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only 
by being used’ (Mill (1859: 74–75)). And these faculties are one of the ele-
ments of well-being (Mill 1859: 72).  
The issue at stake is therefore how to introduce the notion of similarity 
or diversity of options. At the very least this requires some more informa-
tion about the options. The only required information concerns whether 
or not options are similar, or, at most, how diverse they are. This will affect 
the very definition of monotonicity, in the same way that the account for 
reasonable preferences affected autonomy orderings, as well as the formu-A. Baujard: Conceptions of Freedom and Ranking Opportunity Sets 243 
lation of indifference as well.  
3.1  Extreme alternatives 
A first way to take into account diversity is to focus on the most extreme 
alternatives in the opportunity set.  
Klemish-Alhert (1993) represents opportunity sets as convex hulls in 
the space of universal set of goods. The conditions used to compare sets 
are re-expressed in this framework. Convex hull monotonicity for instance 
is a condition that permits us to value the scope of alternatives in the hull. 
This hull will be larger if its boundary alternatives will be far from one an-
other.  
Rosenbaum (2000) assesses freedom from the scope of choices accord-
ing to certain characteristics, requiring a wide amount of information at 
this point. Formally, freedom, as the exercise of significant choices, is a 
function of the mathematical distance between extreme points in the space 
of characteristics. The more distinct these characteristics, the more free the 
individual facing the set. If some characteristic reveal to be more impor-
tant than others, this unequal importance is expressed by unequal weight 
for this characteristic.  
We are then led to focus on the extreme positions. Klemish-Alhert 
(1993: 197) finds this result controversial because it is likely to induce un-
desirable consequences. For instance, enjoying freedom in a country 
where it is just allowed to express extreme opinions will be considered, in 
this framework, as more valuable than in any country where all opinions 
can be expressed except extreme ones. It is hard to swallow that it is more 
significant to choose between extreme opinions than between a diversity of 
mild opinions. To avoid these counter-intuitive consequences, it seems 
interesting to take into account how each option contribute to the diver-
sity of the set, rather than focusing on extreme options.  
3.2  Binary judgements of similarity  
Diversity or similarity of options can be just a question of binary judg-
ments : either two options are similar, either they are not.  
Pattanaik and Xu (2000a) introduce on a similarity relation, written  , 




xSy  as: ‘x  is similar to  y ’ and  xSy ¬  as: ‘x  is not similar to  y ’. For 
all  , we say that   is homogeneous if and only if, for all 








( , aa ) AΠ X ∈ , a similarity based partition of   is de-
fined as a class {
A
1,..., } m A A  such that: (1)  1,..., m A A  are all non-empty sub-
sets of  ; (2)  A 1 m A AA ∪ ∪... = ; (3)  Am A A ,...,  are pairwise disjoint; and 
(4) for all  ,  {1, k ∈ ;, … } m k A  is homogeneous. The similarity based parti-
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tion will be denoted by  () ,() ," () φA φ A φ A ′ , etc.  
Monotonicity and composition are re-formulated in this new setting.  
Condition 12. [S-monotonicity]  For  all  () AΠ X ∈  such that   just con-
tains similar alternatives according to S , and, for all 
A
\, x XA ∈  
[{ } ] xSA A x A ⇒∪ ∼ ]  and [{ } xSA A x ¬ ⇒∪ A   .  
Condition 13.  [S-composition] For all  ,,, () ABCD ΠX ∈ , if 
, C  and   contain similar alternatives, and C  is not 
similar to 
[ACBD ∪=∪= ∅ D
[(A B V V ] A , then   and C  implies  ) D ] A CBD ∪∪ V  and 
[(A B   ) CD    and   implies  ] A CB ∪∪   D .  
Under the simple similarity based rule, opportunity sets are ranked ac-
cording to the cardinalities of their smallest similarity-based partitions.  
Rule 5.  [Simple similarity based ordering] For all  () AB ΠX , ∈ ,  #S A B V  
if and only if  .   () #φ A # ≥ () φ B
Proposition 4.  [Pattanaik and Xu 2000a] V  satisfies indifference between 
no-choice situations (condition 1), S-monotonicity (condition 12) and S-
composition (condition 13) if and only if V  is the simple similarity based 
ordering.  
This result answers the objection raised against the cardinal ordering, 
in which freedom of choice is growing even in the case clones are added to 
existing alternatives. But a different conception of freedom appears then. 
The repairing of the cardinality ordering means that we move from one 
conception of freedom, as a mere and vague conception of opportunity, to 
another conception of freedom, as the valuation of the exercise of signifi-
cant choices.  
3.3  Approximations of similarity 
It might be difficult to definitely hold that ‘alternatives are similar’ or ‘they 
are not’. Bavetta and Del Seta (2001) use the concept of rough approxima-
tions of the sets. They consider, in the universal set of options, first, the 
inner (or lower) set of options that is just composed by similar options, 
and second, the outer (or upper) set of options, whose complement does 
not include any options that are similar to options from the set. This in-
duces two kinds of possible orderings, based on the cardinality of each of 
these rough approximations of the sets.  A. Baujard: Conceptions of Freedom and Ranking Opportunity Sets 245 
3.4  Assessing degrees of similarity 
The next step is to take into account degrees of similarity rather than bi-
nary judgements about similarity. Van Hees (2004) raises a problem 
linked with this ambition. He establishes that the characterization of simi-
larity based orderings is often impossible because of the definition of dis-
tance between alternatives and sets.  
Bervoets and Gravel (2003) propose an ordering of opportunity sets 
based on an ordinal notion of diversity, while Bossert et al. (2003) propose 
a cardinal approach of diversity. The study of bio-diversity, by Nehring 
and Puppe (2002), illustrates another way to take into account the prob-
lem of diversity, considering the diversity of attributes characterizing op-
tions.  
Lastly, Baujard and Gaspart (2006) consider the issue of diversity in the 
framework of equal opportunity. They capture the idea of valuing the ex-
ercise of ‘hard choice’ through a specific trade-off between utility and 
choice. The role of diversity between the alternatives is taken into account 
through a trigger value where utility and diversity seem indifferent.  
4. Freedom as negative freedom: the role of identifying constraints  
Freedom is about the absence of constraints. The differences between the 
conceptions of freedom are due to the focus on different kinds of con-
straints. ‘Negative freedom’ refers to the absence of coercion (see Berlin 
1969). As a relational concept, freedom is defined relative to the con-
straints that other individuals impose on individual choices. It is a space in 
which an individual can act and choose without being prevented by others. 
In this sense, freedom, or unfreedom, does not depend on personal abili-
ties to do what we want, but on other people’s interference, coercion, or 
oppression. Measuring negative freedom supposes to measure the absence 
of this kind of constraints, rather than any other constraints.  
If freedom were to be defined only by this criterion, as soon as there is 
no coercion in both situations, the two following situations would be 
indifferent: there are many available options in the first one, just one 
option is available in the second one. Yet, freedom is greater when non-
prevented opportunities are more numerous. Measuring negative freedom 
therefore has then two aspects: the identification of the origin of 
constraints and the situation of opportunity.  
Constraints may be of different kinds. An action is an opportunity if it 
is doable. But the reason why it is doable is not just that there is no coer-
cion against it realization. Twenty years ago, people could not phone from 
the top of the Mont-Blanc. This opportunity did not exist for technical 
reason. This non-existence did not affect negative freedom but just a tech-
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nical ability. It is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of con-
straints and focus on the negative aspect of freedom when assessing op-
portunity sets.  
Following van Hees (1998), an opportunity situation consists of the or-
dered pair of a feasible set and an opportunity set, (,) A G , describing the 
set of actions   doable from the fact that there exists an adapted technol-
ogy, and the opportunity set   composed by actions that nobody is pre-
venting us from doing by coercion, and that we will call by the general 
term ‘external constraints’.  
A
G
4.1 1. External constraints and negative freedom 
In a first approach, we focus on the external constraints, considering all 
actions as possible, as far as technological possibilities are concerned. The 
basic conditions to capture the idea of freedom are then re-formulated in 
the framework of opportunity situations.  
Condition 14. [Strict  monotonicity] 
x, , ,( ,{ , }) ( ,{ }). yA xy A x y A y ∀∈ ≠  
,, ( , { } ) ( , { } ) .
 
Condition 15.  [Indifference between no-choice situations] 
x yA A x A y ∀∈ ∼
() GΠ X :( , ) ( { }, { })
 
The next condition captures the role of external constraints in the defi-
nition of negative freedom. A person’s negative freedom depends on the 
things she is not free to choose. A situation in which an option has become 
technologically feasible and can be chosen without constraints yields the 
same amount of freedom as the one in which it was not yet feasible. In 
other words, as long as there are no further external constraints, there is 
no reason why negative freedom should change.  
Condition 16.  [Immunity to opportunities deriving from new technol-
ogy]∀∈  and  . x XA G A x G x ∀∈ ∼ ∪ ∪  
Rule 6.  [Constraints-based cardinality ordering] (,) (,) A GB F V  if and 
only if  .   −≥ − () () #B F #A G
According to the constraints based cardinality quasi-ordering, the less 
external constraints to realize technically possible actions, the more a per-
son is free, when freedom is taken as negative freedom.  
Proposition 5.  [Van Hees 1998] Preorder V  satisfies indifference be-
tween no-choice situations (condition 15), strict monotonicity (condition A. Baujard: Conceptions of Freedom and Ranking Opportunity Sets 247 
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14), and immunity to opportunities deriving from new technology (con-
dition 16) if and only if   is the constraints based cardinality quasi-order-
ing.  
V
4.2 2. Technological constraints and negative freedom 
Even though technological constraints may be independent from external 
constraints, they may affect the actual negative freedom derived from an 
opportunity situations. As a matter of fact, if some new technology now 
exists but if it does not change the opportunity set, then the freedom de-
rived from the set is reduced. Innovations are likely to increase freedom to 
the only condition that it is available to the person.  
Condition 17. [Decreasing with new technology]  () GΠ X ∀ ∈  and 




As in condition 16, both the feasible set and the opportunity set is 
changing. The opportunity situation resulting from the combination of 
two should be ranked exactly between the two situations of which it is the 
combination. This captures the idea that an increase in available options 
does not necessarily outweigh the increase in the number of forbidden op-
tions.  
Condition 18.  [Independence with variable technology] If   and   are 
disjoint, then 
A B
, () : (, ,) (,)( , )( ,)
and ( , ) ( , ) , ) ( , ) ( , ).
GF ΠX AG BF AG A BG F BF
AG BF AG A BG F BF
∀∈ ∼ ⇒ ∼ ∪∪ ∼
⇒∪ ∪    
 
Condition 19 generalizes indifference between no-choice situations by 
considering both the feasible set and the opportunity set rather than just 
the allowed alternatives.  
Condition 19.  [Neutrality to any permutation]  () GΠ X ∀ ∈  and for any 
permutation   of  ,  π X () ( ) G πA πG A, ,, ∼
A
 where πA  and   stand for the 
images of   and   under π , respectively.  
πG
G
At this point, van Hees considers the ordering previously proposed by 
Steiner (1983), which depends, not any more on the difference, but on the 
ratio between opportunity set cardinality sets of doable actions.  
Rule 7. [Steiner’s  ordering]  (,)  iff  (,) AE BF V ≥ ## #E #A F B.  248  Homo Oeconomicus 24(2) 
When technological innovations increase opportunity set, freedom is 
increasing.  
Proposition 6.  [Van Hees 1998] Preorder V  satisfies decreasing with new 
technology (condition 17), independence with variable technology (con-
dition 18), and neutrality to any permutation (condition 19) if and only if 
 is the Steiner’s ordering.   V
5. Concluding remarks on the freedom of choice literature 
5.1  Freedom rankings 
I have presented rankings of opportunity sets according to different no-
tions of freedom: freedom of choice, freedom as autonomy, freedom as the 
valuation of exercise of choice, and negative freedom. It is clearly evident 
that there is no unity in the freedom of choice literature. In particular, it 
can be seen that the axioms do not necessarily belong to a single concept 
of freedom and this is a source of confusion.  
It is nevertheless interesting to see what role the axioms play in our 
conception of freedom. Pattanaik and Xu’s (1990) seminal paper, for in-
stance, captures some confusing idea of freedom of choice by valuing the 
scope of choice, where indifference between no choice situations, strict 
monotonicity and independence hold. Most contributions are then con-
sidered as a discussion of this first framework. When strict monotonicity is 
questioned and replaced by some conditional monotonicity, that pays at-
tention to reasonable preferences rather than actual preferences, autonomy 
is at stake. When independence is questioned, it becomes possible to take 
into account diversity and the value of significant choices per se. When in-
difference between no choice situations is questioned and related to dis-
tinct kinds of constraints, we capture the idea of negative freedom.  
5.2  Open tracks for other types of rankings according to one value 
The indifference condition, that seemed relevant for freedom of choice per 
se raises a disturbing problem. With indifference between no choice situa-
tions, we should place : {education} {a glass of champagne}. Yet, the first 
set (or option) leads to many different, valuable, and lasting opportunities 
– such as jobs and consumption... The second set, in contrast, provides a 
short pleasure and does not open up many other opportunities. In other 
words, to speak about freedom in a more intuitive meaning, it is important 
to give up the assumption, imposed by condition 1 of indifference between 
no-choice situations, according to which options are considered to be 
homogeneous.  
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There are two ways to differentiate between options. The first consists 
in considering the actual utility or welfare provided by each option (see 
Sen (1990: 470)). In this case, the obtained ranking captures the idea of 
utility or global well-being. The second way is to count the actual number 
of doable actions for an individual in a given situation, which leads to a 
conception of overall freedom (discussed below).  
How can the idea of utility in an ranking of opportunity set be cap-
tured? This is certainly not straightforward. According to a subjective con-
ception of utility, or according to the experience requirement (Glover 
(1977), Haslett (1990)), an individual should experience the use of an op-
tion to derive utility from it. Yet from an opportunity set, he will just ex-
perience one option, the one he has chosen among all. If this model of 
utility is retained, this means that an opportunity set is not an object of 
utility in itself, it can just be the object of indirect utility. If the criterion to 
rank the sets is utility, what we will be studying is the indirect utility of 
opportunity sets. In this welfarist point of view, choice has no other intrin-
sic value but that of the chosen option. Comparing two sets amounts to 
comparing the utility of the sets, which is captured by the dominance con-
dition:  
Condition 20.  [Simple dominance] For all  , x yX ∈ , if xPy , then 
{} {} x y  
                
. 
Besides, weak monotonicity (condition 4) has to apply. The indirect 
utility derived from the set will depend on the satisfaction the chosen op-
tion will provide. We then have to imagine which option might be chosen 
from the set. The description of the ranking will depend on the relevant 
preference relation: the actual preference relation when it is known and 
posted; the probable preference relations when they are flexible. When 
preferences are given, the ranking of best elements capture the idea of 
utility of an opportunity sets. When preferences are risky, there is no 
unique individual preference relation. Individual preferences depend on a 
parameter whose probability distribution is well-known. Arrow (1995) 
proposes an ordering based on this principle.6 When preferences are 
uncertain, Kreps (1979) proposes a ranking that captures the idea of pref-
erence for flexibility, by valuing indirect utility (Arlegi and Nieto 2001a, 
Arlegi and Nieto 2001b). The maximal elements of the sets according to 
each preference (or utility function) is the only important information to 
compare sets. Of course, if the possible preferences are now interpreted as 
 
6 It is interesting to note there is no need here to use a different framework than the 
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reasonable preferences an individual may have –  rather that actual 
preferences an individual is likely to have – the right interpretation of the 
obtained ordering does not concern flexibility and indirect utility but 
autonomy, as we have seen above. Thus to capture the idea of utility of 
opportunity sets, at least weak monotonicity and dominance should hold.  
The second way to differentiate between options consists in considering 
that freedom derives from the number of actions that are eventually possi-
ble to achieve once all constraints and interaction have been taken into ac-
count (Carter 1999): the idea of overall freedom is expressed in this case, 
i.e. ‘how free people are tout court’ (Carter (1999: 14)). The substantial part 
of freedom stands in the actual possibility or impossibility to do the things. 
On this regards, it is important to incorporate the impact of all constraints 
on the ability to take advantages of the options. Firstly, people may not be 
prevented by anyone to buy some expensive jewelry, but most of them 
could never afford it, even though they would be willing to invest their 
whole budget in it. As it seems now important to describe the system of 
constraints, whatever their nature, that limit the scope of doable actions, 
we are required to give up the independence condition. Secondly, there 
also exist some constraints at the collective level on individual actions. 
‘McEnroe and Becker playing together can both win, but not all together; 
they do not have the collective freedom to both win the match’ (Carter 
1999: 258). It is indeed important to take into account the effect of the 
system of individual interactions on the freedom enjoyed by each individ-
ual. Thus overall freedom could be captured in ranking opportunity sets 
with some alteration of indifference between no choice situation and inde-
pendence conditions, and by considering the system of interactions with 
other people.  
5.3  Freedom and preferences 
I now turn to a discussion of the special links between preferences and 
freedom in the freedom of choice literature. I claim that the role of pref-
erences is distinct when we take into account just reasonable preferences 
or actual utility.  
Firstly, the introduction of reasonable preferences induces a certain 
type of freedom ranking as we have seen above, interpreted as freedom as 
autonomy. Note that the ignorance of the actual individual preferences 
was required to be able to capture the idea of autonomy in the rankings. 
The introduction of preferences is then a way to define the idea of 
freedom.  
Secondly, information about actual individual preferences (given and 
stable, or flexible) is introduced in the framework. The interpretation of 
the resulting ranking will obviously be very distinct. Freedom should then A. Baujard: Conceptions of Freedom and Ranking Opportunity Sets 251 
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be considered as another element of the rankings, while it has been con-
sidered as the key element in the previous sections. I claim that it induces 
rankings that capture individual overall well-being, based on different 
prudential values among which freedom is just an input, just as utility. In 
these rankings, utility can be interpreted with the experience model in the 
sense of indirect utility actually derived from the chosen objects from the 
set; freedom is considered mostly as a basic concept of freedom of choice. 
Global well-being, in contrast, is based on these two values, utility and 
freedom. Therefore, what is commonly called preferences and linked with 
utility would just be an ingredient in addition to freedom to induce some 
individual well-being. In a wide welfarist point of view, there is no reason 
why all these ingredients should not be relevant for well-being.7 There also 
could be others, such as flourishing for instance8 but the rankings of 
opportunity sets we know of focus on these two prudential values: freedom 
and utility.  
The first attempts to introduce utility in the freedom of choice litera-
ture came up against impossibilities (Puppe (1995), Gravel (1994), Gravel 
(1998)). To be able to account for utility in ranking opportunity sets, as we 
have seen above, we must adopt a weak, rather than the strong version of 
the monotonicity condition. In contrast, valuing the intrinsic value of 
freedom requires a strict monotonicity. It is, therefore, quite straight-
forward that one cannot value utility and freedom at the same time.  
As utility and freedom are distinct values to be taken into account in a 
single ranking, it is then necessary to think of ways to make these com-
mensurable. Bossert et al. (1994) for instance provide three distinct rank-
ings: one is a lexical order of preferences over freedom; the other one a 
lexical order of freedom over preferences; and, when both values are given 
an equal importance, the latter ranking reveals to be very incomplete. 
Baujard and Gaspart (2006), in a economic environment framework, have 
used the notion of discontinuity introduced by Griffin (1986: 85-89) to 
capture the idea of a specific commensurability between utility and free-
dom, taken as the value of the exercice of significant hard choices.  
Another way to introduce freedom in global well-being rankings is to 
consider, in a wide welfarist manner, that well-being result from some 
trade-off between freedom and utility. Puppe (1996) considers the role of 
freedom through the options of opportunity sets, but he restricts his at-
                 
7 A confusion can be made in that that the resulting well-being may be called utility in 
certain context, when utility is taken as a wide preference concept of what is good for the 
person. To avoid the risk of confusion, we here chose to use distinct word to call these two 
concepts : the experience of a subjective mental state is called utility, while the judgement of 
what is good for a person according to herself is called well-being. 
8 See Griffin (1986) for a thorough discussion of well-being and its determinants. 252  Homo Oeconomicus 24(2) 
tention to essential alternatives, those that contribute to utility. In the 
Puppe’s rankings, the importance of freedom does not depend on how it 
adds up to utility but rather on how it contributes to utility. Utility is, 
therefore, all what eventually matters. Bossert (1997) considers that well-
being derives from freedom of choice and utility. He proposes a family of 
rankings, in which utilities from each option contribute to the overall re-
sult. With certain assumptions, it is even possible to assign a specific 
weight to each option according to their desirability.  
Thus, utility and freedom may contribute to some overall well-being, 
that might be represented by suitable preferences. It is though important 
to keep in mind the actual interpretation of the resulting preferences, dis-
tinct from the preferences standing for utility only. As I have noted above, 
there is clearly no unity in the freedom of choice literature: some part is 
devoted to capture some specific conceptions of freedom – which was the 
subject of this paper – but some other part is focused on the problem of 
global well-being, in which freedom is an input of the resulting judgment. 
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